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INTRODUCTION
Religious beliefs have always generated controversy. But religious freedom -
the right of individuals and groups to form their own religious beliefs and to
practice them to the extent consistent with the rights of others and with
fundamental requirements of public order and the common good-has long
been a bedrock value in the United States and other liberal nations. Religious
freedom is one thing nearly all Americans, left and right, religious and secular,
have been able to agree upon, perhaps because it protects all of us.' Atheists are
protected from imposition of prayer and Bible reading in state schools;'
churches are protected from interference with the hiring of ministers;' religious
minorities are protected from majoritarian legislation indifferent or hostile to
their concerns.4  Progressive churches are protected when they oppose
segregation or counsel draft resisters;s traditionalist churches are protected
when they oppose abortion or operate faith-based schools;6 nontraditional
faith groups with unfamiliar worship practices are allowed to carry them out in
peace.7 Because none of us can predict who will hold political power, all of us
can sleep more soundly if we know that our religious freedom does not depend
on election returns.
When the Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause in 1990, in the so-called "Peyote Case," Employment Division v. Smith,
Congress passed the corrective Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 9 by
1. See ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION AFTER ALL: WHAT AMERICANS REALLY THINK ABOUT GOD,
COUNTRY, FAMILY, RACISM, WELFARE, IMMIGRATION, HOMOSEXUALITY, WORK, THE RIGHT,
THE LEFT, AND EACH OTHER 61-72, 69 (1998) (noting a high degree of consensus for the
proposition that "[i]n a diverse religious climate, the proper way to treat conflicts between
one religion and another is to give space to them all").
2. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962).
3. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
4. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 5o8 U.S. 520 (1993).
5. For an account of the importance of the Religion Clauses to religious progressives, see
STEPHEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS (2009).
6. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that there is a constitutional right
to educate children in private, including religious, schools).
7. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (20o6);
Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb- 4 (20o6).
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unanimous vote in the House and a margin of 97-3 in the Senate."o Supporters
included the ACLU, the National Association of Evangelicals, People for the
American Way, the American Jewish Congress, the Christian Legal Society,
and virtually every other religious and civil liberties group." Recently,
however, this consensus seems to be weakening- largely from fallout over
culture-war issues such as abortion and the legal recognition of same-sex
relationships. Many activists on these issues see religion as antagonistic to their
interests, and are responding in kind. A new whiff of intolerance is in the air."
University of Chicago law professor and legal philosopher Brian Leiter has
entered the debate with his new book Why Tolerate Religion?" His answer?
Although we should not persecute religious believers, religion as such does not
warrant any "special" legal solicitude such as that provided by the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment." "[T]here is no apparent moral reason why
states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to
structure their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the
standards of evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute
constraints on judgment and action.""s Leiter argues, moreover, that it would
be consistent with "principled toleration" for the secular state to affirmatively
discriminate against religious believers in access to public spaces, such as by
barring student Bible clubs from meeting on public school property, even
when every other form of student organization is free to meet." So long as
religious believers retain the right to express their own beliefs (including
wearing religious symbols and clothing), the regime may advocate a "Vision of
1o. See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 883, 896 (1994).
11. See Brief for the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at app. A, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2704) (listing
amici curiae supporting the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
Laycock, supra note lo, at 895-96.
1. See Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 407,411-18 (2011).
13. BlUAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012).
14. Contra Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(noting, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that the Religion Clauses "give[]
special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations").
15. LEITER, supra note 13, at 63.
16. Id. at 122-26.
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the Good" that is "irreligious"17 and may selectively deny religious believers
and religious speakers equal access to public resources and opportunities.
When it comes to accommodation of practices, and not just beliefs, Leiter
argues that it would be impractical to accommodate all claims of conscience
and "unfair" and "arbitrar[y]" to single out claims that are grounded in
religious belief's So his answer: accommodate none of them, at least if the
accommodation would inflict harm or shift burdens onto third parties. Exactly
what is meant by these assertions, as we shall see, is less than clear. The
argument depends on terms like "conscience," "special," and "harm," but the
book provides no precise definition of their meanings. The author is vague
about what to do when accommodations do not cause harm and when religious
practices have no secular analogue.
Organizationally, the book weds four chapters of ambitious and wide-
ranging philosophical arguments to a fifth and final chapter primarily
addressing two controversial issues of First Amendment law: whether religious
practices are entitled to exemptions from formally neutral laws (to which Leiter
answers "no"), and whether groups may be excluded from otherwise open
public school speech forums because they espouse a religious point of view (to
which he answers "yes").
The first major argument of the book-spread between Chapters One and
Four -is that discussions of religious freedom ought to be framed around the
concept of "toleration." By "toleration," Leiter means protection from coercion
(or "eradication") but something less than neutrality. To be specific, the state
may not "jail or annihilate the adherents of the disfavored claims of
conscience," nor may it "directly target or coercively burden their claims of
conscience" (absent real harm)," but it may use public resources and publicly
controlled institutions to espouse the state's own contrary "religious or
irreligious" Vision of the Good2 o and may exclude dissenters from equal access
to public facilities." The second philosophical argument- Chapters Two and
Three of the book-presents a definition of religion and discusses several
prominent justifications for toleration, concluding that none of these theories
17. Id. at 121.
is. Id. at 102 (claiming that a regime that allows exemptions only for religious claims of
conscience is "unfair" because an exemptions regime only for religious claims "arbitrarily
selects some subset of claims of conscience for special consideration").
ig. Id. at 114-15.
20. Id. at 121.
21. Id. at 122-24.
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can justify a special protection for the free exercise of religion, beyond that
accorded conduct based on nonreligious beliefs." In these chapters, Leiter's
argument consists of two steps. First, he offers a definition of religion as
"categorical demands that are insulated from evidence"" -meaning that
religion is a phenomenon characterized by insulation from "common sense and
the sciences."' Second, he examines several prominent justifications for
toleration offered by John Rawls, John Stuart Mill, and Frederick Schauer, and
in each case concludes that nothing in these justifications warrants tolerating
religion specifically.
More surprisingly, in Chapter Five Leiter concludes that this spare doctrine
of "principled toleration" also does not justify any special protection against the
establishment of religion. As far as "principled toleration" goes, it would be
unobjectionable to declare the Roman Catholic Church the established church
of the nation, and favor it over all other ideological competitors -so long as
dissenting voices are not coercively burdened or silenced. It becomes clear that
Leiter's objection is not to one particular theory of free exercise protections
(free exercise exemptions), but to the entire idea of special protection for
religious freedom.
At a few extraordinary moments in the book, it appears that the author
might even opt for intolerance toward religion -use of the coercive power of the
state to discourage or even "eradicate" religious belief," on the ground that
religious beliefs do real harm to the body politic. Each time, after floating the
argument for intolerance, usually in the form of rhetorical questions rather
than straightforward claims, he retreats. But each time the retreat is based on
the lack of sufficient empirical support for the net harmfulness of religion -not
because of the importance of religious freedom to the individual or to liberal
democracy. At page 59, for example, he poses the question: "isn't there reason
to worry that religious beliefs, as against other matters of conscience, are far
more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty?,"" observing that this might
"form the basis of an argument for why there are special reasons not to tolerate
religion."2 7 He follows this suggestion with the tentative disavowal that "I
wonder" whether "such a demeaning conclusion about religious belief. . . is
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 81.
as. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 59.
27. Id.
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warranted,",,8 leaving the reader to suspect that his support for toleration hangs
on the thread of empirical uncertainty.
And consider this paragraph:
[R]eligious believers overwhelmingly supported George W. Bush,
widely considered one of the worst presidents in the history of the
United States, whom many think ought to be held morally culpable
both for the illegal war of aggression against Iraq as well as the
casualties resulting from domestic mismanagement. Of course, if we
really thought there were some connection between religious belief and
support for the likes of Bush, then even toleration would not be a
reasonable moral attitude to adopt toward religion: after all, practices of
toleration are, themselves, answerable to the Millian Harm Principle,
and there would be no reason ex ante to think that Bush's human
carnage is something one should tolerate. 9
If I understand this passage correctly, Leiter is flirting with the idea that it
would be justifiable to withhold toleration from religious believers because
they have a propensity to support political candidates of whom he disapproves.
If that is his notion of "Millian Harm," sufficient to justify official intolerance
toward American religious believers, we are very far from anything
recognizable as liberalism or democracy.
Ultimately, Leiter concludes that this "Bush carnage" argument for
intolerance is "not warranted," but not because of any principled commitment
to democracy or respect for differing opinion. It is unwarranted because "there
is no reason to think" that religious beliefs "are especially likely to issue in
'harm' to others." 30 Religion has done good as well as evil, he notes,' and not
2s. Id.
29. Id. at 83.
3o. Id.
31. Id. at 83-84 (noting religious resistance to Nazism and apartheid). Leiter shows no
awareness of sociological evidence regarding the connection between religious participation
and civic engagement, charitable giving, volunteer work, obedience to law, or other matters
of civic concern. See ANTHONY S. BRYK, VALERIE E. LEE & PETER B. HOLLAND, CATHOLIC
SCHOOLS AND THE COMMON GOOD 312-43 (1993) (indicating, on the basis of empirical study,
that Catholic education furthers students' communal engagement, social responsibility, and
personal development); PAUL J. WEITHMAN, RELIGION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP 36-66 (2002) (surveying empirical data on the role of religion in American
democracy and concluding that religion helps to promote active citizenship).
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all evil is caused by religion." Nonetheless, he finds it to be a close question.
"Perhaps [religious] beliefs . . . are more harmful, on average, but it seems to
me much more empirical evidence would actually be required to support that
conclusion."" One wishes that the argument for toleration were more robust
than that.
Aside from these disquieting passages, the argument of the book rests not
on the claim that religious belief is specially harmful, but on the more
conventional claim that religion is nothing special. 4 Let us turn to those
arguments.
I. "TOLERATION"
The title of the book, Why Tolerate Religion?, at first blush sounds
anachronistic. The value of religious toleration has not been seriously contested
in the Anglo-American world since the seventeenth century. Strictly speaking,
the "toleration" issue arose in the context of an established church; the
question was whether practitioners of dissenting religions should be permitted
to exercise their faiths without penalty. Britain's celebrated Act of Toleration of
1689, for example, allowed certain sects - dissenting trinitarian Protestants, but
not Jews, Roman Catholics, or Unitarians - to conduct worship services
without being punished for violation of the Uniformity Acts.s
By the time of the American founding, prevailing opinion had moved
beyond toleration. When George Mason proposed in 1776 that the Virginia
Declaration of Rights provide for "toleration" of religion, James Madison
objected on the ground that "toleration" implies an act of legislative grace. He
successfully moved to substitute the term "the full and free exercise of
32. LEITER, supra note 13, at 83-84 (noting Bernard Madoff as an example of harmful behavior
driven by secular greed).
33. Id.
34. Other scholars making a similar argument against the special status of religion include
Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious
Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L. REv. 555 (1998); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion
Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PIr. L. REV. 75 (1990); and Micah Schwartzman, What IfReligion Is Not
Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012).
3S. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment ofReligion, 44WM. & MARYL. REV. 2105, 2114 (2003).
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[religion.]"36 In a similar vein, George Washington wrote to the Hebrew
Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island that "[i]t is now no more that
toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that
another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights."3 It is not an
accident that the United States Constitution contains a Free Exercise Clause,
not a toleration clause.
But Leiter is not using the word carelessly or anachronistically. He makes
clear that by "toleration" he means pretty much what Madison and
Washington understood the term to mean -forbearance -with only a slight
twist: that the state that today is considering whether to permit the practice of
religion is the modern secular state. "[A] genuine 'principle of toleration,"'
Leiter writes, exists only when there is a "dominant group" that "actively
disapproves of what another group .. . believes or does." " Under his definition
of toleration, "one group must deem another differing group's beliefs or
practices 'wrong, mistaken, or undesirable' and yet 'put up' with them
nonetheless."" Leiter candidly "reject[s] the view" that "the right posture for
the modern state is one of neutrality" toward religion. Rather, the posture of
the modern secular state toward religion should be one of "disapproval"4 o -the
only question being whether that disapproval should be tempered with
toleration.'
To Leiter, the "contemporary problem, at least in post-Enlightenment,
secular nations," is "why the state should tolerate religion as such at all."" Just
as the seventeenth-century state, committed to an established church, had to
decide whether to tolerate persons of dissenting faiths, the twenty-first-century
36. I summarize these events in Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding ofFree Exercise ofReligion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1443, 1462-63 (1990).
37. 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRur SOURCES,
1745-1799, at 93 n.65 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
38. LEITER, supra note 13, at 13.
3g. Id. at 8 (quoting Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?, in TOLERATION: AN
ELUSIVE VIRTUE 18, 19 (David Heyd ed., 1996)).
40. Id. at 13 ("Some contemporary 'liberal' philosophers think the right posture for the modern
state is one of neutrality, not toleration, with the disapproval the latter implies. But I reject
the view that any state can really be neutral in this way.").
41. In a later chapter, Leiter denies that his book is an argument "that religious belief per se
deserves disrespect (e.g., intolerance)," rather hotly calling this a "pernicious conclusion ...
that is no part of the argument of the book." Id. at 91. "Disapproval" and "disrespect,"
however, are not far apart.
42. Id. at 14-15.
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state, committed to a particular form of secularism, has to decide whether to
tolerate religious believers at all. Some might say, following the seventeenth-
century philosopher John Locke, that it is futile to attempt to use force to
compel belief (or unbelief), because convictions do not yield to external
compulsion.4 ' But Leiter - probably correctly - points out that the modem state
in fact has "sophisticated means to effectively coerce belief."" The proper
question, therefore, is why "we" - meaning the secular state - "morally, ought
not to eradicate differing beliefs and practices," given that we could.
Leiter claims that "toleration," understood as putting up with beliefs that
the dominant group disapproves of, is "reflected" in the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, and is the "paradigm of the liberal ideal."*4 But
this is incorrect: under the United States Constitution, the state does not deem
religious belief "wrong, mistaken, or undesirable."47 On the contrary, our
liberal republic takes no stand on the truth or worth of any religious belief as
such.41 One of the most widely admired opinions of the Supreme Court states
that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in . .. religion, or
other matters of opinion."49 That proscription of official orthodoxy applies to
Leiter's unbelief no less than it does to a conventionally religious
establishment. It is no more proper for the state to assume religion is false or
unwarranted than to assume that it is true. As James Madison put it, "[t]he
Religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man," and it is an "arrogant pretension" to believe that "the Civil
43. According to Locke:
[T]he care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power
consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the inward
persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And
such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief
of anything by outward force.
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1685), reprinted in LOCKE ON
TOLERATION 64 (Richard Vernon ed., 2010).
44. LEITER, supra note 13, at lo.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 8 (quoting Williams, supra note 39, at 19).
48. Andrew Koppelman's recent book persuasively makes this theme the centerpiece of his
understanding of religious freedom under the First Amendment. See ANDREw KOPPELMAN,
DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).
49. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth."so Indeed, many
statesmen at the time of the Founding believed that religious faith was valuable
or even essential to republican self-government.s" I am not aware of any
statement by a constitutional founder, any decision of the Supreme Court, or
any important document in our constitutional tradition that espouses Leiter's
version of toleration: that religion is wrong, mistaken, or undesirable, but we
should nonetheless "put up" with it.
Leiter acknowledges there is a competing view to his idea that mere
toleration ought to characterize our attitude toward religion. Chapter Four of
the book is devoted to explaining why he rejects Professor Martha Nussbaum's
argument that free exercise exemptions are justified by "respect" for the
religious beliefs of others, even if we do not share them.s2 While the author
states elsewhere that his concern is "state toleration" of religion, "as opposed to
toleration in interpersonal relations,"s" much of the chapter is propelled by
examples of interpersonal relations. The primary argument -spanning seven
pages of the twenty-three page chapter- revolves around whether an atheist
invited to shabbat dinner should participate in Jewish prayers offered by his
host.s4 The problem, you see, is that the guest believes that religion is an
"(epistemically) culpable false belief," and therefore is reluctant to show the
"respect" to his hosts' beliefs that participation in the prayers would express. 5
That is all well and good. Maybe a guest with those views should politely
excuse himself. But what could this possibly have to do with "state toleration"?
Leiter argues by way of analogy that because religious beliefs are false or
unwarranted, they are "not the kind of belief system that could warrant
[affirmative respect],"s6 and thus that the state-like the dinner guest-ought
rightly to grant religion only toleration. But the state is not in the same
position as the guest. The guest, like his host, enjoys full religious freedom to
form his beliefs and to act on them. The question he faces is primarily one of
50. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785),
reprinted in RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 51, 52 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 3 d
ed. 2011).
S1. See McConnell, supra note 35, at 2193-205.
52. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 164-74 (2008).
53. LEITER, supra note 13, at 13.
54. Id. at 73-79.
s. Id. at 77-78.
56. Id. at 68.
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etiquette. The state, by contrast, does not hold an official position on whether
the Jewish religion, or any other, is false- "culpably" or otherwise. The
dichotomy between "tolerating" and "respecting" religion based on individual
judgments about religion's truth or falsity is a red herring when it comes to
questions of governance. Constitutional law is not about good manners or
respect, but about law, power, coercion, and freedom.
The difference between moral demands on individuals and institutional
constraints on the liberal state is fundamental. In the liberal tradition, the
government's role is not to make theological judgments but to protect the right
of the people to pursue their own understanding of the truth, within the limits
of the common good. That is the difference between "the full and free exercise
of religion"" (Madison's formulation) and mere "toleration." Toleration
presupposes a "dominant group"s" with a particular opinion about religion
(that it is "false," or at least "unwarranted"),s" who decide not to "eradicate ,6 o
beliefs they regard as "wrong, mistaken, or undesirable." 6'
By contrast to Leiter's "toleration," religious freedom does not proceed
from any official presuppositions about religious truth. It allows everyone,
believers and unbelievers alike, the right to form their own convictions about
transcendent reality and to live in accordance with them, subject only to the
constraint that they must not invade the rights of others or damage
fundamental aspects of the overall common good. That is a more attractive
vision than Leiter's, and it is far more consonant with our constitutional
principles (even if not always with our practices).
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT
Leiter's philosophical argument can be stated in three steps:
1. Religion is a subset of the broader category, "conscience."
2. What sets religion apart as a distinctive subset of conscience is that
religious beliefs "are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence
57. McConnell, supra note 36, at 1443 (quoting Gaillard Hunt, James Madison and Religious
Liberty, 1 ANN. REP. AM. HIST. AsS'N 163, 166 (1901)).
58. LEITER, supra note 13, at 13.
59. Id. at 78-80.
6o. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 8. The phrase is borrowed from Bernard Williams. See supra note 39.
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and rational justification," yet lead to "categorical demands on
action" (meaning demands that take precedence over competing
desires and interests)."
3. Employing this definition, neither of the two major strands of
modern thought, Kantianism (represented by John Rawls) and
utilitarianism (represented by John Stuart Mill), supports an
argument for special protection for religion. Nor is it supported by
Frederick Schauer's argument from government incompetence.
The argument, however, is not persuasive, for two reasons. First, it
depends entirely on the pejorative way in which Leiter defines religion, and
second, it falls short in its understanding of Rawls, Mill, and Schauer.
A. Religion as a Subset of Conscience
The central argument in the book is that "if there is something morally
important about religious belief and practice that demands legal solicitude, it is
connected to the demands of conscience that religion imposes upon believers,"
rather than the distinctively religious or "sacred" character of those beliefs.6 3
The book is an inquiry into whether there is any reason to single out religious
conscience for legal protections that are not also extended to nonreligious
claims of conscience.
It would therefore seem essential to unpack what is meant by claims of
"conscience" as well as what is meant by "religion." But while the book devotes
an entire chapter to a formal definition of "religion," it provides no definition
of "conscience." I believe, however, that it would be fair to borrow the first
portion of Leiter's definition of "religion" as a definition of "conscience": a
belief system that imposes "categorical demands on action-that is, demands
that must be satisfied no matter what an individual's antecedent desires and no
matter what incentives or disincentives the world offers up.",6  Leiter
comments that the "categoricity" of commands is a "significant feature" not
only of religion, but "of all claims of conscience,, 65 and that seems right. In less
62. LEITER, supra note 13, at 34.
63. Id. at 29-30.
64. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.; see also id. at 37 (positing that "one might think that all commands of morality are
categorical in just this way"); id. at 148 n.17 (claiming that "an experience of categoricity is
central to anything that would count as a claim of conscience").
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jargony language, we may translate this "categoricity" as referring to the
demands of right and wrong, as opposed to self-interest, whim, habit, or
compulsion. 6 The important point is that the demands of right and wrong
may arise from nonreligious as well as religious systems of belief- although, as
Leiter points out, "religion is one of the few systems of belief that gives effect to
this categoricity." According to Leiter, "those who genuinely conduct their lives
in accord with the categoricity of the moral demands they recognize are
overwhelmingly religious."6 ,
Leiter defines religion by four criteria, only two of which he says "matter"
for the purpose of evaluating the claim for tolerating religion as such.6 The
first is "categoricity," as just discussed. The second is that religious beliefs, "in
virtue of being based on 'faith,' are insulated from ordinary standards of
evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common sense
and in science."6' The combination of these two criteria becomes his catch
phrase for religion: "categorical demands on action conjoined with insulation
from evidence," or variants on these words.70
Leiter mentions two candidates for further refining the definition of
religion: that religion involves "a metaphysics of ultimate reality,"" and that it
offers "existential consolation" for dealing with "the basic existential facts
about human life, such as suffering and death."7 Ultimately, he declines to
include these two other elements in his formal definition. The former, he says,
is just "a variation on the idea that religious belief is insulated from evidence,"73
and the latter, he says, is not distinctive to religion, but may be found in such
nonreligious practices as philosophical reflection, meditation, and therapeutic
treatment.74 Thus, "only the first two features [categoricity and insulation from
66. The principal definitions in both the Merriam-Webster and the Oxford English Dictionaries
define "conscience" in terms of "right and wrong." Conscience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conscience (last visited Nov. 26, 2013);
Conscience, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/3946o (last
visited Nov. 26, 2013).
67. LEITER, supra note 13, at 38.
68. Id. at 49.
69. Id. at 34.
70. Id. at 53, 55, 59, 6o, 62, 65, 67, 80-81, 83-85.
71. Id. at 47.
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
74. Id. at 62.
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evidence] . . . matter" for these purposes.75 At times, though, Leiter includes
"existential consolation" as one of the distinctive features of religion, with the
practical effect of "excluding the case of Maoist personality cults, of Marxism,
and (probably) of morality."'7
It is difficult to follow Leiter's method here. At the outset, he asserts that a
proper definition must be based on "features that all and only religious beliefs
have."' But elsewhere, Leiter notes that neither "categoricity"78 nor "insulation
from evidence"79 is unique to religion, yet for unexplained reasons these
features nonetheless do "matter." This is all rather confusing and inconsistent.
Personally, I think it is futile to draw up a list of features descriptive of religion
and only of religion. What makes religion distinctive is its unique combination
of features, as well as the place it holds in real human lives and human history.
Leiter assumes that religion is merely a subset of conscience, distinguished
primarily by its lack of evidentiary warrant. It would be more precise to see
religion and conscience as two overlapping categories, neither fully subsumed
within the other. Conscience has to do with convictions about moral right and
wrong. Some conscientious convictions have a religious foundation and some
do not. Religion is partly about right and wrong, and in that sense overlaps
with conscience. But it involves much more than that. Religion typically
includes a set of beliefs about the nature of the universe, it prescribes practices
that are sometimes more ritualistic than ethical in character (such as taking
communion or wearing a yarmulke), and it is embedded in authoritative
communities involving texts, stories, institutions, leaders, and tradition. It thus
involves much more than conscience, just as conscience comprises more than
religion.so This is important because much litigation involves religious ritual,
ecclesiastical form, and tradition that are not strictly matters of "conscience"
and have no evident secular analogue.
There are claims of nonreligious conscience that are powerful and coherent
enough that they have a moral weight comparable to that of religion. During
the Vietnam War, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving
conscientious objectors whose beliefs, by their own admission, were not
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id. at 52-53.
77. Id. at 27.
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id. at 46-47.
so. See Nathan S. Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1457, 1461
(noting that "religious liberty" and "liberty of conscience" overlap but are not identical).
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"religious" in the ordinary sense (the sense that Congress used in the
conscientious objector statute recognizing exemptions from conscription). The
Court's response was to stretch the definition of religion to include any
"sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption.""' Similarly, in particular contexts of obvious seriousness, such as
protecting medical personnel from being required to perform or assist in
abortions, Congress has protected "moral convictions" as well as "religious
beliefs.""
Leiter, however, does not confine the term "conscience" to claims of this
serious nature. As his paradigmatic example of nonreligious conscience, Leiter
refers to claims based on family tradition and identity,"' which we will discuss
in more detail below. He also includes the "lone eccentric, who for reasons
known only to him, feels a categorical compulsion,""' and the Marxist." The
category is evidently open-ended. If any belief comprising a moral judgment is
"conscience," we would face some wildly counterintuitive claims.
As Leiter points out, "[i]t seems unlikely that any legal system will embrace
this capacious approach to liberty of conscience" because it would be
tantamount to a "legalization of anarchy!"86 In other words, we do not extend
protection to all manifestations of conscience, broadly understood, because we
cannot and should not. Accordingly, the United States Constitution provides
no protection for liberty of "conscience" as such-although particular
manifestations of conscience sometimes receive constitutional protection under
other rubrics (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, due process). In fact,
although Leiter does not mention it, the drafters of the First Amendment
considered using the language of "conscience," voted it down, and used the
term "religion" instead." Leiter thinks that was an error. He argues that
81. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 340 (1970) (holding that "purely ethical or moral" beliefs may entitle an individual to a
conscientious objector exemption).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 3ooa-7 (20o6) (forbidding health care providers receiving certain federal
funds to require individuals to perform or assist in abortions in violation of their "religious
beliefs or moral convictions").
83. LEITER, supra note 13, at 1-3, 64-66, 93.
84. Id. at 93.
85. Id. at 39-40.
86. Id. at 94 (Leiter's exclamation point).
87. This history is set forth in McConnell, supra note 36, at 1488-91.
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"conscience" is the morally relevant concept, and it was wrong to single out the
religious subset for legal protection.
B. "Insulation from Evidence"
If "categoricity" is the element common to both religious and nonreligious
systems of belief making demands on human conduct, it is the "insulation
from evidence" that most clearly distinguishes religion in Leiter's definition,
and does almost all the work in his analysis. By smuggling into the definition
of religion a feature that makes religious belief seem unreasonable, the book
unsurprisingly comes to the conclusion that this very unreasonableness
disqualifies religion from a moral claim to special legal solicitude. The
conclusion is baked into the premise.
Most obviously, Leiter's definition stacks the deck by assuming that
religious belief "always" is to some degree "false, or at least unwarranted."8
That is a sectarian premise, predicated on a questionable view about
evidence. 89 According to Leiter, the "only epistemically relevant
considerations" that warrant belief are "those that figure in common sense and
the sciences."9o He goes so far as to say that philosophic attempts to justify
religious beliefs are "nothing more than an effort to insulate religious belief
from ordinary standards of reasons and evidence in common sense and the
sciences, and thus religious belief is a culpable form of unwarranted belief given
those ordinary epistemic standards."9 1
No religious believer would recognize this description. Religious believers
do not think they are "insulating" themselves from all the relevant "evidence."
They think they are considering evidence of a different, nonmaterial sort, in
addition to the evidence of science, history, and the senses. It would be more
88. LEITER, supra note 13, at x (emphasis omitted). Leiter sometimes seems to equate "falsity"
with being "unwarranted," see id. at 77 ("Religious belief is (epistemically) culpable false
belief- that is, it is unwarranted and one ought to know it is unwarranted." (emphasis
omitted)), but some unwarranted beliefs are true.
8g. For Leiter's view of the kind of evidence that would support the reasonableness of religious
belief, see id. at 40-42. For discussion of why this view of evidence is questionable, see ALVIN
PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRISTIAN BELIEF (2000); and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Can Beliefin
God Be Rational iflt Has No Foundations?, in FAITH AND RATIONALITY: REASON AND BELIEF IN
GOD 135 (Alvin Plantinga & Nicholas Wolterstorff eds., 1983), which offer criteria for the
application of the concept "rational" that do not indulge in reductive evidentialism.
go. LEITER, supra note 13, at 58; see also id. at 39.
gi. Id. at 81.
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accurate, and less loaded, to amend this second part of Leiter's definition to say
that religion is a system of belief in which significant aspects are not based on science
or common sense observations about the material world.
To begin with, much religious thought is not "insulated" at all.
Developments in biology, physics, linguistics, archeology, and other disciplines
have had profound impact on Biblical hermeneutics and theology in
mainstream Protestantism and Roman Catholicism,92 and "practical reason"
has played a major role in natural law thinking since at least Thomas
Aquinas.93 To be sure, some religious traditions are more insulated from
scientific developments than others. The Navajo creation story, for example, is
impervious to archeological and linguistic evidence that the tribe migrated to
the Southwest from Canada only a few centuries before the arrival of
Europeans, and fundamentalist Christian belief in the historicity of Noah's
flood and the literal six-day creation, depending on how these ideas are
understood, is much the same. But to say that "insulation from evidence" is a
defining characteristic of "all"' (or even most) religions is simply false.
Religion is constantly changing, and constantly interacting with the culture
and other ways of understanding the world.
More importantly, the standards established by the scientific revolution,
however powerful within their proper domain, are not obviously applicable to
such matters as esthetics, morality, values, love, trust, and ultimate meaning.
The scientific method does not claim to provide insight into these areas of
human understanding. Indeed, some philosophers of science maintain that
92. See, e.g., MARcus J. BORG & N.T. WRIGHT, THE MEANING OF JESUS: TWO VISIONs 3-30
(1999) (discussing the impact of archeology, history, and cultural study in understanding
the life and message of Jesus); GARY DORRIEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN LIBERAL
THEOLOGY: IDEALISM, REALISM, AND MODERNITY 2 (2003) (describing the development of
modern liberal theology in Protestant and Catholic thought as a movement characterized by
the belief that "God was immanent in the evolutionary processes of nature and modern
cultural development"); HANS W. FREI, THE ECuPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN
EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS (1974) (charting the broad
ranging shift from precritical narrative readings of the Bible to historical-critical readings);
THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF BIBLICAL STUDIES 567-674 (J.W. Rogerson & Judith M. Lieu
eds., 20o6) (offering a collection of essays in Biblical hermeneutics drawing on archeology,
textual criticism, literary criticism, and feminist theory); JOHN POLKINGHORNE, SCIENCE AND
THE TRINITY: THE CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER WITH REALTY (2004) (exploring the relevance of
claims of science and modern physics to Christian theology).
93. See Thomas M. Osborne, Jr., Practical Reasoning, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF AQUINAS
276 (Brian Davies & Eleonore Stump eds., 2012); see also DANIEL WESTBERG, RIGHT
PRACTICAL REASON: ARISTOTLE, ACTION, AND PRUDENCE IN AQUINAS (1994).
94. LEITER, supra note 13, at 27.
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even science depends on certain leaps of faith, which are not the products of
mere observation of material evidence. 9 5
In a footnote, Leiter acknowledges that "of course" there may be matters
such as the "meaning of life" that "are insulated from evidence only in the
sense that no scientific evidence would seem to bear on them."96 But he
immediately dismisses the importance of this observation on the ground that
" [s]uch beliefs are not my concern here, mainly because they are not distinctive
to religion."9 7 What could he be thinking? His entire argument is built around
the idea that religion is "a culpable form of unwarranted belief' precisely
because of its "insulation from evidence."98 If it turns out that religion's
"insulation from evidence" is attributable to the fact that "no scientific evidence
bears" on many questions of a religious nature, then religious belief cannot be
criticized on these grounds. There is no reason to apply the "ordinary epistemic
standards" of science and material observation to questions on which they do
not bear. If Leiter is confining his "concern" to beliefs on which "scientific
evidence would seem to bear," he is leaving out most of what is central to
religion, including beliefs underlying almost all claims of religious conscience,
which are the subject of this book.
Leiter is entitled to confine himself to whatever categories of evidence may
strike him as persuasive, but he cannot reasonably label as "culpable" or
"unwarranted" the sincere conclusion of many persons, including thinkers of
the first rank, that there are nonmaterial aspects of reality supporting religious
belief. Leiter can no more disprove the existence of nonmaterial reality than
religious believers can prove the existence of God on the basis of material
evidence alone. A color-blind person might think the idea of color is bunk,
because the evidence of his own eyes fails to reveal it, but that does not entitle
him to assume that those who see color are engaged in a culpable form of
unwarranted belief. He, not they, might be the one lacking.
As individuals, we might be justified in dismissing the idiosyncratic beliefs
9s. See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 157-58 (3 d ed.
1996) (noting that a decision to adopt a new scientific paradigm often demands "defiance of
the evidence provided by problem-solving. [The scientist] must, that is, have faith that the
new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only
that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made on
faith"); see also RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 341 (ist ed.
1979) (arguing that we should think of science as a "value-based enterprise").
g6. LEITER, supra note 13, at 149 n.i8 (emphasis omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 81.
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of small numbers of persons, especially when these people do not appear
rational in other respects. But religious belief has been attested to by millions
of seemingly intelligent and rational people over long periods of time, who
report that they have experienced, in some way, transcendent reality. There is
even, as Leiter admits, a "large literature in Anglophone philosophy devoted to
defending the rationality of religious belief."99 Leiter chooses to disregard this
testimonial evidence, along with its philosophical defense, without so much as
"address[ing] . . . in any detail" -really, at all-the arguments that are
offered.' Why? The only reason he supplies is that the "dominant sentiment
among other philosophers" is that belief in God is "unsupported by reasons
and evidence."' 0 ' With all respect, there is no reason to think that members of
modern philosophy faculties have any special insights about God. But as we
shall see, if you take away Leiter's conceit that religious believers are culpably
insulating themselves from evidence (as opposed to responding to a different
kind of evidence), most of Leiter's conclusions fall of their own weight.
Indeed, even for those who agree with Leiter as a matter of personal
conviction that there is no persuasive evidence supporting the truth of religious
belief, but agree with Madison and Washington that the truth of religion is not
a subject on which the government should take a stand, Leiter's conclusions do
not follow, because they rest on the view that the state should treat religious
beliefs and arguments as lacking evidentiary warrant. It is better to proceed on
the premise that people may reasonably disagree about the truth or falsehood
of religious claims.
C. Rawls
Having offered a definition of religion, the next step in Leiter's argument
involves asking whether unique toleration for religion can be justified by
several prominent arguments for toleration. Turning first to the Kantian (or
better, "neo-Kantian") argument, Leiter adverts to John Rawls's well-known
thought experiment in which we choose fundamental principles of justice
under which we should be governed as if from behind a veil of ignorance-
meaning we do not know what our circumstances (including our moral and
99. Id. at 8o.
oo. Id.
lo. Id. (quoting Alex Byrne, God, Bos. REv., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 31).
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religious views) will be, or whether we will be in the majority or minority.oz
Rawls concludes that while behind the veil we would choose to protect an
equal liberty of conscience. We would not "take chances with [our] liberty,"
because the value of being able to form and follow our own moral and religious
beliefs outweighs any gain we might achieve from the possibility of being in a
majority and imposing our views on others.10 3 This supports legal protection
for freedom of conscience.
In a revealing aside, Leiter questions whether Rawls is correct that people
really are better off when "they can freely choose what to believe and how to
live."0 4 He suggests that "many, perhaps even most" people "make foolish
choices about what to believe and how to live," with the result that they make
themselves "miserable."' 0 Indeed, these people may "perhaps" not "make real
choices at all," but instead they may be "hostage to social and economic
milieux," which produce only the "illusion of choice.",,o6
This line of reasoning is ironically reminiscent of the seventeenth-century
Puritan preacher John Cotton, an opponent of religious toleration in his day.
Cotton argued that the
[f]undamentals are so clear, that a man cannot but be convinced in
Conscience of the Truth of them after two or three Admonitions: and
that therefore such a Person as still continueth obstinate, is condemned
of himself: and if he then be punished, He is not punished for his
Conscience, but for sinning against his own Conscience.o 7
Cotton, like Leiter, thinks that those who disagree with him on the
fundamentals are "culpably" wrong, that their foolish ideas will render them
miserable for eternity, and that their mistakes are the product of something
other than sincere conscience.
Having offered these authoritarian musings, cautiously cushioned in the
102. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 207 (1971) [hereinafter RAwLs, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE]. Leiter declines to draw support from Rawls's later work, JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL
LIBERAUSM (2005), calling it an "unfortunate" development in Rawls's thought, LEITER,
supra note 13, at x, and asserting that it plays no role in his analysis, id. at 141-42 n.17.
103. LEITER, supra note 13, at 16 (quoting RAWLS, ATHEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 1o2, at 207).
o4. Id. at 18.
1os. Id.
106. Id.
107. JOHN COTTON, THE BLOUDY TENET WASHED AND MADE WHITE IN THE BLOOD OF THE LAMB
13 (Quinta Press 2009) (1647).
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form of questions rather than assertions, Leiter then disposes of them in this
way: "These illiberal thoughts ... have little purchase these days within the
mainstream of English-speaking moral and political theory, though not, as far
as I can tell, because they have been refuted systematically."o10s Readers must
wonder whether in an environment less constrained than the English-speaking
mainstream, Leiter would attempt to pursue these "illiberal thoughts" more
seriously, and what his answer would be. In any event, Leiter "put[s] these
doubts to one side" and accepts, "[fjor the sake of argument," Rawls's
conclusion that behind the veil of ignorance we would choose to protect the
liberty to form and follow our own beliefs.
He then gets to his real argument. He points out, correctly, that Rawls
explicitly includes "moral" along with "religious" obligations in his analysis,
and thus that nothing in Rawls's argument is "specific to religion." Leiter
concludes, therefore, that "the Rawlsian perspective cannot help us evaluate
the principled case for toleration of religion qua religion."o 9
This is too quick. To be sure, Rawls does not explicitly address whether his
thought experiment could be used to evaluate constitutional protections for
religion qua religion, but it might. Behind the veil of ignorance, we do not
know whether we believe in a supreme authority or not, but if we do, by
definition belief in a supreme authority creates obligations superior to all
others -in Madison's words, "dut[ies] .. . precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.""10 Leiter himself recognizes
that religious beliefs involve issues of "ultimate reality,"" meaning "the aspect
of reality that is most important for valuable/worthwhile/desirable human
lives."". From a Rawlsian perspective, from behind the veil of ignorance, there
is every reason to protect our capacity to pursue that which "is most important
for valuable/worthwhile/desirable human lives." Indeed, as a matter of
historical experience, many hundreds of thousands of real people have
regarded their religious beliefs as so important that they sacrificed their lives,
fortunes, social standing, opportunities for career advancement, and bodily
comfort in order to worship in accordance with their convictions, in the teeth
of official hostility and persecution. Their testimony counts for something.
ios. LEITER, supra note 13, at 18.
109. Id. at 55.
110. MADISON, supra note 50, at 51.
111. LEITER, supra note 13, at 47.
112. Id. at 48.
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The freedom to carry out our perceived religious obligations in the face of
political opposition might be more important than the freedom to carry out our
personal conclusions about right and wrong, for two reasons. First, we might
think that adherence to the supreme authority of the universe is an
ontologically superior obligation to adhering to what we, as fallible persons,
might conclude about morality. That is what "the sovereignty of God" would
seem to entail. Leiter himself comments that religion is one of the "few systems
of belief' that actually "gives effect" to convictions about morality-that "those
who genuinely conduct their lives in accord with the categoricity of the moral
demands they recognize are overwhelmingly religious.""' Maybe there is a
reason for that. Second, we might think that it is essential for governments to
make and enforce moral judgments, even in the face of differences of opinion,
but think it not essential for governments to make and enforce religious
judgments. It is impossible to conceive of a government that does not enforce
norms of right and wrong, but not at all difficult to conceive of a government
that leaves religious judgments to individual conscience. At least behind a veil
of ignorance, we might think these things, and might think they warrant
distinctive constitutional protection for freedom of religion.
What is Leiter's answer? He says that "it is hard to see how persons in
Rawls's original position, operating behind the 'veil of ignorance,' could
reason, in particular, about the value of insulation from evidence and the
categoricity of demands, let alone existential consolation."" 4 This is an ipse
dixit, not an argument. It is nothing but an arbitrary exclusion of religious
belief (defined in Leiter's pejorative way) from the original position. The whole
point of the original position is that the parties behind the veil of ignorance "do
not know, of course, what their religious or moral convictions are.""' These
might include a belief in God. And if that is a possibility, a party in the original
position might think it is special and worth protecting, even if Leiter does not.
D. Mill
Leiter's argument regarding Millian utilitarianism is even more
problematic. Mill argued that we can discover truth, or be fully persuaded of
the truth, only if we are exposed to a wide range of beliefs and practices -even
if some of them are false. As Leiter explains, "truths about how we ought to
113. Id. at 38.
114. Id. at 54-55.
11s. Id. at 16 (quoting RAwLs,ATHEoRYOFJUSTICE,supra note 1o2, at2o6).
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live""' support "a wider scope of toleration, one that encompasses practices, not
just beliefs.""' Mill's argument thus supports free exercise of religion, and not
just speech or opinion about it.
Leiter, however, says "we can dispense with [these] epistemic arguments for
toleration . .. quickly," because "[t]here is no reason to think, after all, that
tolerating the expression of beliefs that are insulated from evidence and reasons-
that is, insulated from epistemically relevant considerations -will promote
knowledge of the truth.""s In other words, because religious belief is totally
without evidentiary warrant, it cannot possibly contribute to the search for
truth. He fits religious belief into an apparent exception Mill draws for
mathematical mistakes, where there is "nothing at all to be said on the wrong
side of the question.""
The argument thus depends on Leiter's tendentious claim that religious
believers "insulate" themselves from evidence as opposed to recognizing
nonmaterial evidence of a sort that Leiter does not recognize. Put aside Leiter's
personal convictions about the falsity of religion, which reasonable people need
not and the liberal state must not accept, and his argument here fails. Leiter
pretends to be arguingfrom Mill, but in fact he is arguing the opposite of Mill. I
quote the passage Leiter cites from On Liberty, but in its entirety:
But, some one may say, "Let them be taught the ground of their
opinions . . . ." Undoubtedly: and such teaching suffices on a subject
like mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong
side of the question. The peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical
truths is, that all the argument is on one side. There are no objections,
and no answers to objections. But on every subject on which difference
of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be struck
between two sets of conflicting reasons. Even in natural philosophy,
there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts; some
geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, some phlogiston instead of
oxygen; and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the
true one: and until this is shown, and until we know how it is shown,
we do not understand the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to
116. Id. at 20.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 55-56.
iig. Id. at 57 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 35 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett 1978)
(1863)).
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subjects infinitely more complicated, to morals, religion, politics, social
relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for
every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which
favour some opinion different from it.'20
Leiter takes it to be a faithful extension of Mill's position that science, like
mathematics, presents a way of knowing that ought to be applied to all our
beliefs because its empirical force has demonstrated its superiority beyond all
argument. But Mill thinks nothing of the sort. For Mill, mathematics is a
unique domain of knowledge precisely because the "peculiarity of [its]
evidence" -namely, the way that mathematical evidence is not susceptible to
objections or answers to objections - renders argument superfluous. Science
("natural philosophy"), by contrast, is just one more place where argument and
competition among positions is needed in order to determine and justify our
beliefs. And for subjects "infinitely more complicated" than science, such as
religion, Mill regards the clash of various epistemic positions as even more
essential.'" Neither science nor religion can be resolved by dogmatic appeals to
authority or the pretense that there is only one side to the question.
Here again Leiter reveals himself as the Anti-Mill. Take his reference to
"[t]he large literature in Anglophone philosophy devoted to defending the
rationality of religious belief."'" One might think Leiter would wish to engage
with the ideas in this literature, in a Millian spirit, if only to prove why they are
wrong. But no. Leiter says it "[s]uffice[s] to observe that its proponents are
uniformly religious believers," and that "much" of this literature has the air of
"post-hoc ... rationalizations." He then resorts to authority- to the "dominant
sentiment among other philosophers," which, he reports, is on the other
side.' The first avenue of attack is a tautological ad hominem. It is neither
surprising nor disqualifying that philosophers who find religious belief rational
are likely to be believers, just as philosophers who take the opposite view are
likely to be nonbelievers. What does that prove, other than that there is a
difference of opinion? The second avenue of attack-Leiter's appeal to the
dominant sentiment among supposed experts - is both elitist and
authoritarian, in precisely the sense that Mill condemned. Religious ideas
should not be put to a vote, not even of philosophy PhDs.
120. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 49 (Alan S. Kahan ed., Bedford 2008) (1863).
121. I am grateful to Mark Storslee for this point.
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Careful readers will also note the inconsistency between Leiter's use of
Rawls and his use of Mill. Rawls does not comment on whether his theory
would support a special role for religious freedom, beyond that due to secular
moral beliefs, and Leiter takes this as tacitly rejecting such a role""-even
though we can construct an argument, fully consistent with Rawls's
methodology in A Theory of Justice, that supports such a role. Mill explicitly
states that his theory applies with particular force to religion, yet Leiter argues
that it does not, employing an argument from expert authority that Mill would
never accept. How can this be reconciled?
E. Schauer and "Governmental Incompetence"
Leiter also touches too quickly on one other argument-Fred Schauer's
"argument from governmental incompetence," made in defense of the freedom
of speech. 2 s Even on the assumption that speech sometimes causes real harm
that outweighs any possible benefit, Schauer argues that there is no reason to
think that the government will make the right choices about what speech to
regulate. Politicians are likely to suppress speech when it advances their own
political interests, which is unlikely to coincide with the suppression of
speech that causes the most net harm. The same argument can be made
about freedom of religion, with even greater force. A cornerstone of the
American constitutional tradition of religious freedom is the view-held by all
stripes of religious opinion -that the government has no competence to judge
religious truth.
Public schools can teach all kinds of nonsense, and people may not like it,
but they confine their objections to ordinary channels. When public schools
purport to teach religious truth, by contrast-for example, by allowing a prayer
at a graduation -it is a constitutional case of the highest order. As a supporter
of the Court's School Prayer Cases,126 I have gone on Christian talk radio to
defend the prohibition of collective spoken prayer in school. The natural
impulse of the audience tends to be to defend prayer, but when I explain that
agents of the government should not be entrusted with the power of teaching
our children how and what they should pray, even the most fervent believers
usually come to see the wisdom of the decisions. Whatever our views on
124. Id. at 17.
125. Id. at 12 (citing FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 86 (1982)).
126. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
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religion, no one trusts the government to guide our spiritual lives. That is what
Schauer is getting at. Even if we would not be principled disestablishmentarians
in a theoretical world where government officials are theologically trustworthy,
the actual fact of government incompetence is good reason to deny them the
power to guide the religious life of the nation.
Leiter's reaction to Schauer's argument is brief and baffling. After devoting
almost two pages to explaining Schauer's argument, Leiter offers one (long)
sentence in response. He says: "Perhaps this kind of instrumental argument for
state toleration is more plausible," but "it does not tell us why we, morally,
ought not to eradicate differing beliefs or practices, it tells us only that we
(through the instrumentality of the state) are unlikely to do it right."" That is
not much of a response.
To begin with, Schauer's is not just an "instrumental" argument. It goes to
the heart of the matter. Government is not omnicompetent. It has a large, but
limited, role in human affairs, limited to matters where collective coercive
action is necessary and likely salutary. It makes no sense for a people to give its
government powers that are outside its competence, and it makes no sense to
talk about constitutional design on the assumption that government will
always exercise its power intelligently and beneficently. Second, what is wrong
with an instrumental argument? We might erect constitutional barriers to
governmental action because the activity we are protecting is especially
important to the individual or to society, and we might erect constitutional
barriers to governmental action because the power we are limiting-the power
to "eradicate differing beliefs or practices"-is especially inappropriate to
government, or susceptible to abuse. Leiter offers no reason why the latter is
less persuasive a reason than the former.
That the state is "unlikely to do it right" is evidently not, to Leiter, a deeply
serious objection. He operates on an abstract plane where a magisterial "we" -
those who share his own convictions and prejudices -control the levers of
power. The entire book is about what this infallible "we" should do about
religion. The American tradition of constitutionalism, though, proceeds on the
premise that "enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm""' and that
the "Civil Magistrate is [not] a competent judge of Religious Truth."2 9 Leiter's
dismissal of Schauer's argument misses this important point.
127. LEITER, supra note 13, at 12.
128. THE FEDERALIST No. lo, at 8o (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
129. MADISON, supra note 50, at 51-52.
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III. THE LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The conclusion of the first four chapters is that there is no "principled
argument that picks out distinctively religious conscience as an object of special
moral and legal solicitude."' In Chapter Five, entitled "The Law of Religious
Liberty," the author applies that theoretical conclusion to two practical issues
of First Amendment law: whether persons whose religious beliefs conflict with
neutral and generally applicable laws are entitled to exceptions or
accommodations, and whether state institutions such as schools may deny
religious groups equal access to otherwise generally available public resources.
As to the first, he argues that singling out religious claims of conscience would
be "unfair" because it "arbitrarily selects some subset of claims of conscience
for special consideration,"' 3 ' although he leaves room for exemptions that
would not shift burdens onto others. As to the second issue, Leiter argues that
it is "consistent with principled toleration" for the government to discriminate
against religious views of which it disapproves and to exclude them from equal
access to public property and resources, particularly in the schools" 2 -though
he is careful to insist that this discrimination must not extend to "persecution"
or the imposition of "coercive burdens."3 3
Putting these two positions together, religious beliefs and practices may not
be given "special moral and legal solicitude," but they may be subjected to
special civil disadvantages and exclusions. It is "arbitrar[y]" and "unfair" to
single out the religious "subset of claims of conscience" when this would
protect the religious but not when this would disadvantage them. What theory
could support these two conclusions?
A. Free Exercise Exemptions
Professor Leiter's rejection of free exercise exemptions bears strong
superficial similarity to the Supreme Court's still-controversial 1990 decision,
Employment Division v. Smith. 3 4 In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the
Court held that members of the Native American Church have no
130. LEITER, supra note 13, at 92.
131. Id. at 102.
132. Id. at 123.
133. Id. at 104.
134. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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constitutional right to use the drug peyote in their religious ceremonies,
because the Free Exercise Clause provides no protection against neutral laws of
general applicability. Leiter, similarly, argues that "there should not be
exemptions to general laws with neutral purposes, unless those exemptions do
not shift burdens or risks onto others." 35
There are three important differences, however, between Leiter and the
Court. First, Leiter's rationale is entirely different from, even contradictory to,
the Court's. Leiter bases his opposition to exemptions on his belief that it
would be "unfair" and "arbitrar[y]" to protect religious beliefs if it is not
feasible to extend the same protection to nonreligious claims of conscience.' 6
The Court, by contrast, primarily based its opposition on the jurisdictional
impropriety of allowing judges to weigh religious needs against the importance
of governmental purposes."' The Court did not think it improper for the First
Amendment to single out religion, and in fact even stated that legislative
exemptions for religious practices may be "desirable."" 8
Second, Leiter excludes from his "no exemptions" rule cases where the
exemptions would not shift burdens or risks onto others. The Smith Court
recognized no such limitation. In fact, because the ceremonial use of peyote
does not harm others, Leiter seems to conclude that Smith itself was wrongly
decided.13  Once this exclusion is taken into account, Leiter advocates a far
broader scope for free exercise exemptions than the general rhetoric of the book
suggests-almost as broad, perhaps, as pre-Smith interpretations of the Free
Exercise Clause.
Third, Leiter recognizes the danger that a no-exemptions regime might
"open the door to state conduct motivated by antireligious animus, but under
the pretense of legitimate, neutral objectives."140 The Smith opinion seems
oblivious to that problem. The problem is especially serious because it is
135. LEITER, supra note 13, at 4.
136. Id. at 102.
137. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (criticizing a system "in which judges weigh the social importance of
all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs"). The Court also purported to rely on
text and precedent, but these arguments were unpersuasive. See Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1114-16, 1120-27
(1990).
138. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
139. LEITER, supra note 13, at loo.
140. Id. at 104.
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exceedingly difficult for courts of law to ferret out official pretense. Leiter
argues that
if we had reason to think that it will be impossibly difficult to
discriminate between the facade of neutral purpose and actual neutral
purpose in legislation that burdens religion-then we might think
exemptions for religious claims of conscience the preferable approach,
notwithstanding the inequality such an approach entails and
notwithstanding the burden on the general welfare.' 4
That is a generous concession, though it ultimately appears not to sway him
from his no-exemption position.
Leiter frames his discussion of the exemptions issue around one illustrative
case: whether baptized adherents of Khalsa Sikhism, who have a religious
obligation to carry a ceremonial dagger, or kirpan, should be exempted from
general school regulations prohibiting students from carrying weapons. Leiter
compares this Sikh believer to a hypothetical "rural boy" of the same age whose
"family traditions and upbringing" call for him to carry a knife as a symbol of
his identity as a man in his community.44 He asks us to think about what
should be done in the two cases. Should both boys be exempted? Neither?
Only one of them?
Leiter says there "can be no doubt" that his hypothetical rural boy's felt
need to carry a knife is a "conscientious obligation" -indeed, an "equally
serious obligation[] of conscience" to that of the Sikh. 4 1 In my opinion, far
from there being "no doubt" about this, the idea that the rural boy has a
conscientious obligation comparable to the Sikh is highly dubious. Strictly
speaking, conscience is an individual's judgment about right and wrong-such
things as not killing innocent persons, telling the truth, and caring for your
children. It strikes me as very unlikely that the hypothetical rural boy believes
that his family's tradition of knife carrying is a moral obligation of this nature.
It may take away from "who he is" to deny him the right to carry a knife, but it
does not make him commit a wrong. There are many practices tied up in ethnic
or familial identity that are not moral in nature. This does not make them
unimportant, but it does put them in a different category than that of
141. Id. at 107.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id.
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"conscience." A religious dictate, by contrast, is more than a question of
identity; it is a duty.
As Leiter points out, "no Western democracy" would recognize a legal right
on the part of the rural boy, though it is easy to imagine that rules against
pocket knives might not always be rigorously enforced, especially in rural
communities where knives are commonplace and useful. The Sikh, by contrast,
has a good case. In the leading decision in the United States, Cheema v.
Thompson,'" the Ninth Circuit approved an arrangement under which the Sikh
student was exempted from the "total ban" on "weapons," provided his kirpan
had a dull blade of only 3-3 12 inches, was sewn into its sheath, and was worn
under his clothing so as not to be plainly visible."'s (The dissenter's main point
of disagreement was to think that the blade should be still smaller, and riveted
to the sheath.146) In other cases, courts have found that kirpans are not
"weapons" at all, in light of their design and ceremonial purpose.'4 7 Leiter
focuses on a Canadian Supreme Court decision, Multani v. Commission scolaire
Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 14 in which the Sikh student was allowed to wear his
kirpan without these protective limitations.
One might expect Leiter to say that these cases were wrongly decided at a
level of principle, because it would be unfair and arbitrary to allow the Sikh
student to wear a kirpan when the rural boy has no right to carry a knife. After
all, the rural boy's conscientious claim is "equally serious" to the Sikh's.14 9 But
that does not seem to be Leiter's view. "Certainly," he says, "the state should
tolerate the various religious practices of Sikhs under the general rubric of
liberty of conscience."' Apparently this is so even though no Western
144. 67 F.3d 883 (9 th Cir. 1995) (arising under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, prior to
City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 993,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20oobb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
145. Cheema, 67 F.3d at 884, 886.
146. Id. at 892, 894.
147. See, e.g., State v. Easterlin, 149 P-3 d 366, 369 n-3 (Wash. 20o6) (suggesting that a Sikh may
argue to the trier of fact that he was not "armed" while wearing the kirpan); State v. Singh,
690 N.E.2d 917, 920-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the trial court erred when it
denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence the
kirpan "was designed or adapted for use as a weapon" as required for a violation of the state
concealed weapon statute); Hof van Beroep [HvP] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, Jan. 14,
2009, L2o4 P 2007 & L205 P 2007 (Belg.), http://www.sikhs.be/files/IMG_ooo3.pdf.
148. [20o6] I S.C.R. 256 (Can.).
149. LEITER, supra note 13, at 3.
150. Id. at 66.
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democracy protects the right of the rural boy to wear his knife, and Leiter does
not argue that they should. Leiter's reservation about the decisions -and it is
an entirely reasonable one, even if I might come out the other way -is that the
courts in the kirpan cases gave insufficient weight to the risk of harm to others.
If the equality objection (no exceptions for religion unless there would be an
exception for secular conscience) were dispositive, Leiter would not need to
discuss the risk of harm. Leiter concludes that "both boys should be out of
luck,"' but that is because he thinks an exemption in this context would create
a risk of harm to others. If the harm could be minimized or eliminated -as the
Ninth Circuit thought it could, through the protective conditions -it appears
that only the rural boy would be out of luck.
Note what has happened to Leiter's argument. When it comes down to the
real case of the Sikh boy and his kirpan, the "culpable falsity" of religious belief
drops out of the calculus, and the analysis shifts to what he calls the "side-
constraint" of not allowing harm to others. Leiter's position turns out to be
"that there should not be exemptions to general laws with neutral purposes,
unless those exemptions do not shift burdens or risks onto others.""' Another
way to put this is: "There may be exemptions to general laws with neutral
purposes unless those exemptions shift burdens or risks to others." The real
point of difference then becomes: How much burden? How much risk?
It appears that in cases where the Millian Harm Principle is not violated by
an exemption, Leiter's rhetorical case against "special" solicitude for religion
turns out not to matter very much, if it matters at all. As Leiter understands,
his hypothetical rural boy's perceived need to carry a knife will not and should
not receive legal protection. This is not because the law is hostile or indifferent
to nonreligious claims of conscience. It is because the claim is too broad, too
undefined, too unfocused to be enforceable as a legal right.
As Leiter recognizes, this practical problem of open-ended subjectivity is
not true of religious claims, at least not to the same extent. "After all," he
points out,
a litigant who asserts a claim of religious conscience must reference a
religion. Religions typically have texts, doctrine, and commands . . ..
Membership in the religion in question usually depends . . . on
participation in practices, rituals, and ceremonies. All of this gives the
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id.
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courts a rich evidential base for assessing the genuineness of a claim of
conscience.'s
These practical differences lead Leiter to the uncomfortable thought that
"perhaps we should simply extend legal protection for liberty of conscience only
to claims of conscience that are rooted in communal or group traditions and
practices that mimic, from an evidential point of view, those of religious
groups."' After a few pages debating the "unfairness of such inequality,"'
Leiter concludes that "the inequality of treatment of claims of conscience is not
necessarily fatal to a scheme of universal exemptions for claims of conscience.",S 6
Translation: it is permissible, after all, to single out religious claims and
those nonreligious claims that "mimic" religious claims, and to give them
special solicitude.
We cannot know how different this revised position is from the pure
protection of free exercise of religion without knowing how often nonreligious
claims "mimic" religion in this sense. This might well be a very small category.
Leiter himself observes that "those who genuinely conduct their lives in accord
with the categoricity of the moral demands they recognize" -which
presumably is the heart of the matter-"are overwhelmingly religious."' As
already noted, the Supreme Court found that the claims of two Vietnam-era
conscientious objectors were close enough that they warranted religious
exemptions,'s but there have been no others. In the very situation Leiter uses
to illustrate the problem - the Sikh and the rural boy - the latter claim does not
sufficiently "mimic" the former to warrant legal protection.
Having talked himself out of the claim that "the inequality of treatment of
claims of conscience is . . . fatal to a scheme of universal exemptions for claims
of conscience,"S 9 Leiter drops the subject with no further discussion -until the
very end of the book, when he returns to the position that the "selective
application" of toleration to the conscience of only religious believers "is not
morally defensible.""o Even then, however, he equivocates. He reiterates his
153. Id. at 95.
154. Id. at 96.
155. Id. at 97.
156. Id. at 99.
157. Id. at 38.
1s8. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
159. LEITER, supra note 13, at 99.
16o. Id. at 133.
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support for a "No Exemptions approach . .. to claims of conscience that are
burden-shifting,",,6 ' but as to non-burden-shifting exemptions, it still appears
to be his position that religious claims and those that "mimic" religious claims
are entitled to exemptions.
How different that is from the current regime depends entirely on what he
means by "mimicking" religion and what counts as harm. On the actual
practical meaning of those key ideas, Leiter says almost nothing.
B. Harm
The question of free exercise exemptions thus turns out not to hinge on the
philosophical arguments of the first four chapters, but instead on the
application of the Harm Principle. Some religious exemptions entail harm or
the risk of harm to third parties, and some do not. In the former category
Leiter gives as examples "exemptions from zoning regulations for religious
institutions, exemptions from mandatory vaccination schemes, or exemptions
from a ban on knives in the schools.""' In the latter category are such
exemptions as "the right to wear certain religious garb, or to use certain
otherwise illegal narcotics in religious rituals.""' So, the Peyote Case was
wrongly decided after all.
The analysis of free exercise claims has always taken harm to third parties
into account. Madison wrote that the free exercise of religion should prevail "in
every case where it does not trespass on private rights or the public peace.",,6 4
Most of the early state constitutions protected the exercise of religion up to the
point that it endangered public peace and good order.165 Prior to the Peyote
Case, free exercise litigation turned almost entirely on questions of harm,16 6
161. Id. at 130. Leiter uses the term "burden-shifting" not with regard to burdens of proof in
litigation, but as referring to cases where protection for one person's conscience would
impose a burden on someone else.
162. Id. at 99-100.
163. Id. at oo.
164. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July to, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 98, 100 (G. Hunt ed., 1901).
165. 1 discuss these provisions in greater detail in McConnnell, supra note 36, at 1455-58, 1461-66.
166. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause did
not mandate an exemption from social security taxes for an Amish employer because such
accommodation would undermine the mandatory contribution system at the heart of the
program); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 4o6 (1963) (noting that infringement of a
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and cases governed by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act'6 7 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act'16 employ that same
standard."6 9 But the idea of "harm," or of "burden-shifting," is not self-
defining. If these are to be useful legal concepts, courts must be able to make
defensible judgments both about degree and nature of harm.
Unfortunately, neither courts nor scholars have given serious analytical
attention to what counts as "harm." Leiter quotes John Rawls as saying that
liberty may be limited "to prevent an invasion of freedom that would be still
worse," 70 which implies some sort of weighing or balancing of harms, to
determine which is "worse." That is not easy to do with any consistency or
predictability. And Leiter refers many times to John Stuart Mill's Harm
Principle, according to which "the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.""17 But that statement merely begs the question:
What counts as harm?
There are, of course, many easy cases. Leiter mentions that "the state need
not tolerate ... killing the infant children of the alleged heretics."17 ' No one
will argue with that. But what about parents who make decisions about their
children's upbringing that others -maybe experts, maybe majorities -think are
deleterious? A test case might be Wisconsin v. Yoder, 7 1 where the Supreme
Court held that Amish families have a free exercise right not to send their
children to school after the eighth grade. Was that "harm" in the Millian sense?
claimant's free exercise rights can be justified by only "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount [state] interests" (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945))).
167. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20oobb to 2000bb- 4
(1994)).
168. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-i to -5(2006)).
16g. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 437 (2006)
(pointing out that the government had not advanced any argument as to why allowing a
free exercise accommodation under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act would cause
the kind of "administrative harm" recognized as a compelling interest in earlier cases);
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (mandating that when considering a
prisoner's free exercise claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, courts take into account the burdens the accommodation imposes on non-
beneficiaries).
170. LEITER, supra note 13, at 22 (quoting RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 215).
171. Id. (quoting MILL, supra note 120, at 23).
172. Id.
173. 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972).
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What about prisoners whose religious practices -for example, a kosher diet -
increase the cost to the taxpayers ?"74 Is that "harm"? What about slitting the
throats of chickens and sheep in a religious ceremony?"' When members of
three small California Indian tribes sought to block construction of a logging
road through their sacred places in a national forest, was the loss of the
economic benefits to the logging companies a Millian "harm" ?176
Outside the context of free exercise claims, we do not live in a Millian
world. A great deal of modern legislation coercively adjusts the burdens and
benefits of life, helping some at the expense of others, in ways that Mill
presumably would not approve. Many modern free exercise controversies arise
in the context of social and economic regulation that coerces transactions and
dictates their terms. In our post-Lochner, which is to say post-Mill, world, if the
problem is merely economic redistribution, there is generally no constitutional
obstacle to these schemes. But what if the regulatory scheme demands a
violation of conscience? From the baseline of the regulatory requirement
imposed on everyone, an exemption for one individual can be said to "harm"
the intended beneficiaries of the law, because they will not receive the benefit.
But from the standpoint of the Millian Harm Principle, an exemption to such
regulation merely returns the parties to the position they occupied before law
coercively intervened.
For example, in the contraceptive mandate cases, the government has
decided to shift the cost of obtaining contraceptives (including abortifacient
drugs) from the user to her employer, through a mandatory term in the health
insurance contract. There is nothing constitutionally objectionable about that
for most employers, but what about those for whom providing abortifacients is
a violation of conscience ?'17 Leiter objects to "burden-shifting" religious
exemptions, but what if the burden-shifting goes the other way, and the grant
of an exemption would return the parties to a clearly constitutional status quo
ante?
174. See, e.g., Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F. 3d 1179 (ioth Cir. 2002) (finding a prison's refusal to
provide free kosher meals to claimants a violation of the First Amendment notwithstanding
budgetary concerns).
175. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city
ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice violated free exercise principles).
176. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (rejecting the free
exercise challenge to the government's infringement on tribal sacred land).
1n. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3 d 1114 (i0th Cir. 2013) (holding that
employers with a religious objection to abortifacients cannot be required to include them in
health insurance coverage).
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For another example, a wedding photographer in New Mexico, Elaine
Huguenin, declined to provide her services to a lesbian couple, out of the
conscientious belief that same-sex marriages are contrary to God's will.7 8 The
couple easily found another wedding photographer. Were they harmed by
Elaine's refusal to film their nuptials? If Elaine had declined their business
because she had another booking, or because she was going on vacation, no
one would think they were harmed. It would appear that the only real "harm"
was the communicative impact of Elaine's action-the feeling of offense
experienced by the lesbian couple because of Elaine's reasons. In other
contexts, the Court routinely holds that people may not be punished because
others are offended by what they say. Yet state officials fined the photographer
for her refusal, and the New Mexico Supreme Court recently upheld the fine as
constitutionally legitimate."' Should we treat offense as "harm" in the context
of a free exercise claim for exemption?
In an intriguing footnote, Leiter says that "to exempt Catholic priests from
performing gay marriages would not be a burden-shifting exemption as long as
gay couples can otherwise be married."so From the perspective of harm or
burden-shifting, that example is not different in any meaningful way from the
Elane Photography case, unless the priests' religious status is the driving factor
(meaning that religion is "special" after all). Leiter purports to distinguish the
case of a Catholic pharmacist who objects to dispensing morning-after pills on
the ground that "depending on the community at issue and the availability of
the relevant medicines," this could be burden-shifting.'8 ' I say "purports"
because in the two litigated cases involving such pharmacists, in Illinois and in
Washington State, the evidence showed that conscience exemptions did not
have meaningfiul effects on patient access to the drugs.' Thus, it would seem
that, in Leiter's view, the government should not be able to enforce public
accommodation requirements or universal service obligations against service
providers with conscientious objections, except in the rare circumstance where
the service would not otherwise be available.
One more example: How does the Millian Harm Principle apply to the
178. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3 d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
179. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P-3 d 53 (N.M. 2013).
18o. LEITER, supra note 13, at 162 n.1.
181. Id.
182. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-
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hiring of ministers by churches?"8 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
gives everyone a right to obtain employment without discrimination based on
sex.'4 If a woman goes to seminary and is otherwise qualified for an available
position, can an Orthodox synagogue refuse to hire her as a rabbi? Who is
shifting burdens onto whom, and relative to what baseline?
Questions of this sort will dominate free exercise litigation for the next
decade or two. My sense is that very few free exercise claims seek authorization
to invade the private rights of third parties or to inflict harm (in the Millian
sense) upon them. Most, instead, resist the blanket enforcement of regulatory
schemes that interfere with natural liberty in a way that, in some cases, also
burdens conscience. Leiter does not say much about these situations outside of
footnote 11 to Chapter Five,' but that footnote suggests that the logic of his
arguments may be more supportive of these claims for exemption than the
more generalized rhetoric of the book would suggest.
C. Establishment ofa "Vision ofthe Good"
The book closes with an argument that the establishment of religion is not
inconsistent with Leiter's conception of "principled toleration." As a heuristic
device, Leiter contemplates a "scenario in which the state, instead of
disestablishing religion in the public schools, endorses a particular religion
(say, Catholicism) and thus declines to let funding for public education be
utilized for supporting Hinduism or atheism."' 6 This means, among other
things, that "public school facilities" (such as classrooms in the afternoon)
"would be available to the Catholic Student Society, but not to the Hindus or
the atheists or perhaps even to the Republicans!8 So long as dissenters are
permitted to express contrary views using their own resources, including
wearing religious symbols or garb to school, and to attend alternative sectarian
schools,'88  he says this establishmentarian scenario is consistent with
183. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(holding that a "called" teacher was a "minister" under the ministerial exception, which
barred teacher's employment discrimination claim against her religious employer).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(a) (2oo6).
185. LEITER, supra note 13, at 162 n.1.
186. Id. at 126.
187. Id. (Leiter's exclamation point).
188. Interestingly, Leiter adds that the alternative sectarian schools in his hypothetical
establishmentarian regime are funded by the state "in the manner of Britain." Id. at 127.
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"principled toleration.",8 ,
That is probably true. The government could use its prestige, power, and
resources to support one vision of religious truth while still leaving dissenters
free to dissent. The establishment of religion may be consistent with mere
toleration, but it is not consistent with the "full and free exercise of religion" 90
that our founders adopted at the federal level in lieu of toleration. About half a
dozen states pursued some form of tolerant establishment in the early years of
the Republic, when the Religion Clauses did not apply to state governments,
but all of them dismantled their establishments by 1833. No one, to my
knowledge, mourns their passing.
Toleration might be the most we can hope for in nations of the Middle
East, where the population is overwhelmingly of one religious faith and there is
a long tradition of union between mosque and state, but for pluralistic liberal
democracies, mere "toleration" would be a step backward. From the point of
view of religious freedom or of liberal constitutionalism more generally, it is
hard to see why anyone would prefer Leiter's hypothetical Catholic
establishment to a regime of religious neutrality. As Madison and others
pointed out long ago, the establishment of religion is bad for religion,
including the established faith, bad for dissenters, bad for government, and
bad for freedom.
Leiter recognizes that it is "possible that a religious or irreligious
establishment reduces citizens with differing views to a second-class status.' 9 1
But for some reason this "is a separate question," which requires a "culturally
nuanced inquiry." 92 He says no more against it.
Of course, Leiter has no interest in establishing the Catholic religion. What
he defends is the establishment of secularism, where we would use the public
schools to inculcate ideologies of a nonreligious nature and prevent voluntary
student groups from using the facilities on an equal basis for prayer or Bible
study.193 His defense of establishment is a disguised attack on the modern
constitutional doctrine that the state must be neutral toward religion and may
not deny equal access to otherwise open public facilities to groups on account
Does this suggest that our current system in which the government runs secular schools and
(mostly) refuses to pay the costs of religious alternatives is intolerant?
189. Id.
19o. Hunt, supra note 57, at 166.
191. LEITER, supra note 13, at 129-30.
192. Id. at 130.
193. Id. at 120-22.
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of their religious point of view.'94
Now, the idea of a secular state may sound harmless. We often use the
term, loosely, to describe a nonsectarian or nonconfessional state -a state that
is not committed to a particular religion or religious worldview.'9 s But Leiter is
using the idea in a more insidious way, to denote a state that is committed to
secularism as a substantive position-that is, to what he calls "irreligion, in the
form of atheism or otherwise.""' The establishment of secularism would stand
in the same relation to religious beliefs as his hypothetical Catholic
establishment stands to Hinduism, atheism, and Republicanism. The whole
point of this sixteen-page detour 97 into antidisestablishmentarian theory is to
legitimate the use of governmental institutions, especially schools, to promote
secularism or irreligion and to discriminate against religious speech.
A state that is neutral toward religion is different. Such a state may
promote ideas consistent with democratic republicanism, but will not promote
religion over irreligion or the other way around. It "may place its imprimatur
on values and worldviews that are inconsistent with the claims of conscience of
some of its citizens,,"" 8 just as-in the words of the Supreme Court-it may
pass laws that "happen[] to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions."'99 But it cannot teach religion (though it can teach about religion
in a non-catechetical way), and it cannot teach "irreligion" either. And when
194. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of
Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (applying a similar equal access
principle to a radical political organization).
195. I discuss implications of the two meanings of "secular" in Michael W. McConnell,
Reclaiming the Secular and the Religious: The Primacy ofReligious Autonomy, 76 Soc. RES. 1333
(2009). See also Charles Taylor, The Polysemy of the Secular, 76 Soc. RES. 1143 (2009)
(describing the developing and contested meanings of "secular" and noting that modern
conceptions often emphasize some form of neutrality).
196. LEITER, supra note 13, at 129. To be sure, Leiter stops short of calling for an actual
establishment of irreligion, but only because he has not (yet) "made the argument" that
irreligion "is in fact a proper object of appraisal respect." Id. That should not be a difficult
argument for him to make, since the reason he regards religious beliefs as unworthy of
appraisal respect revolves around the "falsity" of religion. See id. at 75-85. There is no
indication Leiter believes irreligion is false.
197. Id. at 114-30.
198. Id. at 117.
igg. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
442 (1961)) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the denial of funding for
abortions).
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such a state opens its facilities to private persons for speech of their own
choosing, it must neither favor nor disfavor groups on the basis of their
religious or other beliefs. We should remember Justice Arthur Goldberg's
admonition in the School Prayer Cases that "a brooding and pervasive devotion
to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious ... [is] not
only not compelled by the Constitution, but ... prohibited by it."2 0 0
Leiter's defense of the establishment of religion brings us back, full circle,
to where we began discussion of this book. It seemed odd and anachronistic
that Leiter would write of religious "toleration" instead of religious freedom.
Toleration was a term associated with the religious establishment. As President
Washington wrote to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, in
disestablishmentarian America "[i]t is now no more that toleration is spoken
of."2o' It turns out that Leiter wants to return to the earlier regime, but with
secularism rather than Anglicanism in charge. I hazard the guess that he will
not persuade many readers not already predisposed to that point of view.
2oo. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schenmpp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
201. McConnell, supra note 36, at 1444 (quoting 31 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
supra note 37, at 93 n.65).
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